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BTC 
ETH THORChain reportedly refused to freeze funds associated with Bitget hacking
It has been reported that the decentralized cross-chain protocol THORChain has refused to block funds associated with Bitget exchange hacking. An estimated $387.5 million in stolen assets is flowing to Bitcoin through the protocol. The incident sharply focuses on the question of whether "permission-free infrastructure" should and can intervene when suspected illicit funds flow through its liquidity pool.
THORChain's reported position on Bitget hacker funds
THORChain's node operators and governance participants reportedly refused to freeze or blacklist addresses suspected of Bitget hackers when funds flowed through the agreement. The deal, which was reported to be worth $387.5 million, was one of a single attempt to move money over the Internet.
THORChain is a decentralized cross-chain liquidity protocol with no central administrator. Unlike centralized exchanges that have compliance teams and can respond to freeze requests from law enforcement agencies, THORChain's architecture decentralizes transaction verification to independent node operators. No single entity has the right to unilaterally suspend transactions.
This is not the first time THORChain has been at the forefront of post-hacking financial flows. Previously, a Coinbase hacker used THORChain to clean US$44.94 million in ETH; another Coldcard hacker also used THORChain to exchange stolen BTC. This establishes an obvious pattern: threat actors choose the protocol precisely because of its censory-resistant design characteristics.
Decentralization and intervention: tensions at the governance level
This reported "non-intervention" reflects the original intention of the agreement, rather than a single policy decision. THORChain's node set together governs the network; any coordinated action requires broad consensus among globally distributed anonymous participants, and each participant is individually motivated to maintain the neutrality of the agreement. [TAG 27]
Critics argue that when there is no response mechanism to confirmed theft, systems that do not require permission effectively become money laundering infrastructure. Proponents counter that introducing address blacklists would undermine the agreement's core value proposition. As THORChain continues to expand its protocol capabilities, including native redemption integrations, stakes in this governance debate rise.
Continue to pay attention to subsequent developments in capital flows
随着资金据报流向比特币，下一个可观察的信号将来自链上活动，以及 Bitget、执法部门或区块链分析公司的任何官方回应。比特币透明账本的特性意味着，即使经过转换，资金仍可追踪，调查人员已在之前的交易所黑客事件中遵循过类似的线索。
如果 THORChain 节点社区或核心贡献者发表声明，将有助于澄清这种不干预是正式治理的结果、技术上的不可能，还是仅仅因为缺乏协调的行动请求。Binance 此前支持 THORChain RUNE 网络升级的事实表明，主要中心化玩家对该协议未来如何处理此类情况持有利益关切。
任何接收转换后比特币的服务（包括交易所、场外交易柜台或混合协议）可能会面临监管机构的压力，要求冻结或标记与据报黑客地址相关的 incoming 资金。这种施加在“出口端”而非“桥梁”上的二级执法层，历史上一直是调查人员在追回被盗加密资产方面取得最大成功的领域。
