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BTC 
ETH Ethereum developers propose to rebuild pledge contracts to prepare for post-quantum cryptography.
Ethereum developers have proposed to rebuild the contract passed by each verifier when entering the pledge process. This is the first concrete step towards introducing post-quantum cryptography for the network's more than 100 billion dollar pledge layer.
The draft was submitted to the Ethereum Improvement Proposal Library on Monday, addressing a limitation in existing contracts: it hardcodes parameters for BLS12 -381, fixing the public key to 48 bytes and fixing the signature metadata to 96 bytes. Post-quantum solutions require more space, and current contracts have no room for expansion.
The new alternative allows key and credential metadata to reach 8192 bytes each, and requires each deposit to declare the "credential scheme" it uses. Scheme zero represents BLS. The proposal specifies no other scheme, leaving the actual form of the post-quantum verifier key to future EIP definitions.
The contract runs in three modes-disabled, BLS enabled, and BLS retired-and the author writes that once retired mode is entered through a system call, no subsequent call will be able to re-enable the BLS registration feature.
The proposal passes deposit data to the consensus layer, while leaving the cryptographic part to be clarified later. It requires a coordinated fork across two layers to take effect.
The pull request is marked as a draft, pending review by the EIP editor, and its contract address, deployment code, and two activation timestamps are marked as "Pending".
Thomas Coratge, one of the three authors, wrote a tweet on the same day about the uncertainties that still exist in underlying cryptography. Summarizing a speech by Stanford University cryptographer Dan Bonet, he wrote that both Bitcoin and Ethereum are "highly inclined" to hash-based signatures that rely solely on the network's existing trust base. The stateless version standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology accounts for approximately 8KB per signature, consistent with the upper limit set by the new area contract, while the compact alternative comes with a counter that leaks the private key if the signer reuses it.
"Post-quantum cryptography is not a simple upgrade," Colatre wrote.
The Ethereum Foundation formed a team last year to plan the post-quantum transition of the network. Meanwhile, a report released in May by quantum security company Project Eleven pointed out that by 2033, the probability of a machine capable of cracking elliptic curve signatures will exceed 50%, and may even be achieved in 2030.
According to this analysis, more than 65% of Ethereum is stored at addresses where the public key is already exposed on the chain.
