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BTC Bitcoin Core 合并安全补丁，修复签名漏洞
2026年9月25日，Bitcoin Core 合并了一项重要的安全加固措施。该措施防止其签名代码在针对没有对应输出的 SIGHASH_SINGLE 输入时产生分离式签名（detached signature），从而关闭了一个可能导致支付收款人被更改而无需暴露所有者私钥的安全缺口。
SIGHASH_SINGLE 签名缺陷的潜在影响
SIGHASH_SINGLE 的设计初衷是将交易输入绑定到同索引的输出上，使签名与特定的资金去向绑定。当匹配的缺失输出不存在时，这种绑定关系就会失效：在旧版（Legacy）交易中，哈希固定值为1；而在 SegWit v0 中，hashOutputs 被置零。这导致生成的签名实际上并未承诺给任何具体的接收方。
这一问题的实际后果非常严重。在这种边缘情况下产生的签名，即使输出地址被替换，依然保持有效，因为签名摘要从未包含过目的地信息。据相关技术分析指出，旧版输入面临额外风险：只要“缺少输出”的条件持续存在，针对同一密钥控制的其它 UTXO，攻击者可以重用这种缺失输出的 SIGHASH_SINGLE 签名。
为何这是操作陷阱而非私钥窃取攻击
该修复方案的贡献者 Matias Furszyfer（furszy）在提交请求中写道：“SIGHASH_SINGLE 仅承诺输入索引处的输出。如果该位置不存在输出，则它不承诺任何输出……这意味着即使输出被交换，签名仍然有效。这是一个‘操作陷阱’，使得资金可以在未经所有者同意的情况下被重定向。”
此攻击不需要提取任何私钥。攻击者完全利用合法生成但范围错误的签名进行操作，使得仅通过密钥卫生检查很难发现此类攻击。鉴于比特币当前交易价格接近 85,400 美元，即使是 modest 的 UTXO 集合，该漏洞也具备真实的货币价值风险。
Bitcoin Core 新安全机制如何应对风险
PR #35984 将缺失输出的检查移入了 CreateSig 这一共享签名原语中。由于 SignTransaction、SignPSBTInput 以及未来的任何签名路径都会调用 CreateSig，因此它们今后都不会产生危险的签名。关键在于，同一 PSBT 中的其他有效输入不受影响，并继续正常签名。
在修补之前，SignTransaction 已经规避了该边缘情况，但 SignPSBTInput（进而影响 walletprocesspsbt）仍可能对其进行签名。这种不对称性意味着依赖 PSBT（BIP174）进行离线或硬件签名的钱包流程存在风险，而直接签名看似安全。将检查整合到 CreateSig 中消除了这种差异。
Operational security implications for nodes and wallet operators
This fix does not silently generate erroneous signatures, but instead completely rejects signing affected inputs. Operators using walletprocesspsbt will see these inputs skipped rather than receiving tamperable authorization instructions. Although Bitcoin's fourth-quarter outlook is still influenced by macro factors, wallet-level health standards now have one less hidden failure mode to consider.
Future concerns for users and developers
As of October 4, 2026, this security measure is located on the main development branch of Bitcoin Core. At the time of writing, no marked production versions or confirmed post-migration schedules have been determined. Downstream wallet software and hardware signers that implement their own PSBT signature logic need to be reviewed separately to determine whether they are independently affected.
No CVE identifier is currently assigned, and there is no definite list of affected wallet provider versions in the public material. Users should pay close attention to the official Bitcoin Core release instructions before drawing operational conclusions to see the version included in PR #35984. Bitcoin's recent sell-to-wall breakthrough of $85,000 indicates continued activity on the chain, making timely implementation of signature security hardening a practical priority for custodial and unmanaged wallet maintainers.
Weekly funds flow charts for Bitcoin and Ethereum ETFs also highlight the growth of institutions 'exposure to Bitcoin, raising the operational risk of any signature-layer vulnerabilities that could redirect funds at the wallet level.
Summary of Points (TLDR)
- Bitcoin Core PR #35984 will be merged on September 25, 2026 to prevent signing SIGHASH_SINGLE inputs that lack corresponding outputs and stop production of signatures that do not promise payment to the payee.
- This check is now added to CreateSig and covers SignTransactions, SignPSBTInput and future signature paths; other valid PSBT inputs are not affected.
- This fix exists only in the development branch; no production version or confirmed post-migration plan has been announced, and downstream wallet implementation requires a separate review.
