THORChain 为网络暂停辩护，批评者质疑其去中心化

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THORChain 称网络暂停为紧急安全措施，而非冻结特定资金或兑换

THORChain 表示，其网络暂停是一项紧急安全机制，旨在保护协议。暂停并非针对特定资金或个体兑换的选择性冻结。

在2026年5月发生的漏洞事件中，攻击者从流动性池中窃取了1,070万美元。在此期间，攻击者的地址从未被列入黑名单，也未被阻止在 THORChain 上进行兑换操作。

THORChain 是无许可且设计上不进行审查的。正如安全研究员 Michael Perklin 所述，它是一个中立的公共物品/工具。

THORChain 从未实现严格去中心化

@THORChain 将自己与 BTC 和 ETH 等去中心化 L1 进行类比并不成立。不要为了获取被盗资金的兑换费而纵容犯罪分子——或将整个行业置于风险之中。

托管方式：TSS 金库 ≠ 基础层共识
在 BTC/ETH 上，用户使用自己的密钥控制资产。矿工/验证者仅负责排序和打包交易，他们从不持有用户资金。单个矿工最坏的情况只是拒绝包含您的交易，他们无法发送您的币。
每个 THORChain 出站（金库 → 用户/攻击者）都需要由当前活跃集合通过 GG20 TSS 阈值签名主动生成。在兑换期间，资金存放在由这些节点共同控制的 TSS 金库中。
释放被盗资金是一个主动签名事件，而非“我们无法阻止的中立排序”。正如 @star_okx 所说：从托管角度看，它是用户和原生链之间的中介。“分布式集中式托管”不等于去中心化。
验证者集合：规模较小，且可以协调
官方文档显示：THORNodes 质押 RUNE 以加入。活跃集合上限约为100个（可扩展至250+），每3天左右轮换一次，剔除最旧、最慢、质押最低的节点。
节点在 Dev Discord 的 #mainnet 频道上实时协调——匿名中继、投票（Mimir / 节点投票）。这是一个拥有通信渠道、投票流程和执行工具的组织。这与 BTC/ETH 全球匿名且无协调路径的集合不同。
干预是设计的一部分：存在运行手册，且有先例。
make pause：一个节点即可暂停网络（每次触发720个区块，可堆叠）。口号：“暂停赚取，频繁暂停！”标准是“谨慎行事”。误触发可以通过 make resume 撤销。
按链签名暂停：节点投票可以仅暂停一条链的出站签名——这是在不使整个网络瘫痪的情况下停止 ETH/BNB → BTC 退出的必要工具。
Mimir 治理：节点可以实时投票更改参数、暂停交易、暂停签名。
Precedent: When THORChain itself was emptied in May 2026, they paused and made a controlled pause to prevent further flow.
Inaction means connivance
In the Bybit case, the attacker purged all 499,000 ETH within 10 days, mainly converting it to BTC through THORChain. This cost THORChain approximately US$5.9 billion in volume and approximately US$5.5 million in expenses.
In the Bitget case, approximately 101.5 BTC (approximately US$8.5 million) has been transferred out through THORChain, and an additional approximately 27.63 million XRP (approximately US$43 million) is being converted to BTC. Potential expense income: Hundreds of thousands of dollars.
In February 2025, verifiers voted to intercept North Korea-related funds, and later revoked the decision. Pluto, a core contributor to the interception, left after that.

The chain suspension/outbound denial of North Korean addresses and funds attributed by the FBI and OFAC is in line with THORChain's own "funds at risk" emergency framework. THORChain should fulfill this responsibility. Don't put the industry at risk for expense lines.

@GoPlusSecurity |On September 27, 2026,

Perklin rejected this comparison as picking data and false equivalence. He believes that Bitcoin miners, Ethereum validators and THOChain node operators can all shut down their systems to block transactions, but doing so will also hinder legitimate activity.

This is data selection at best, and at worst, false equivalence. In any case, this is full of AI-generated junk content.

所有现存的工具本质上都是中立的。使用工具的人决定了他们是将其用于善还是恶，你不能因为人的行为而指责工具。

那些垃圾内容将 THORChain 的兑换比作“主动签名事件”，暗示有人在一旁随时准备为犯罪所得转账盖章，但这完全不是事实。

当一笔 BTC 交易被犯罪分子签名时，比特币矿工可以拔掉矿机电源以防止其被挖矿。以太坊矿工可以拔掉验证器电源以防止其被挖矿。Thornode 操作员可以拔掉他们的 Thornode 电源。

在这三种情况下，都没有主动选择签名的过程，只有主动选择关闭机器的过程。

当互联网路由器路由犯罪请求和响应时，其运营商也可以“主动”拔掉路由器电源。微软可以取消犯罪分子使用的操作系统的授权，戴尔可以取消犯罪分子使用的硬件的授权。

但他们没有这么做。

为什么所有这些参与者不关闭他们的机器来阻止数百起犯罪交易？

因为这样做也会阻止数百万起合法交易。

使用比特币、以太坊、路由器、交换机、计算机、操作系统和 THORChain 的理由要远远多得多。这些都是中立的公共物品。

我们不能因为犯罪分子使用了汽车就禁止汽车。

我们不能因为凶手使用了刀就禁止刀具。

All existing tools are essentially neutral. The person who uses the tool determines whether they use it for good or evil, and you cannot blame the tool for human behavior.

Michael Perklin (@mperklin) |September 27, 2026

His view is that the tools themselves are neutral and the judgment of their use should be viewed separately from the behavior of the person using them.

How much control should the network have?

This issue is easier to understand when you compare the debate between THORChain and its critics to what happened in Sui. Both cases involve networks that can be stepped in when problems arise, but they use power differently.

Sui chose to act after Cetus, its largest decentralized exchange, suffered an approximately $223 million vulnerability attack in May 2025. Sui's validators (the computer that confirmed the transaction) froze approximately $162 million in funds associated with the attackers, while approximately $63 million has been transferred to Ethereum. A few days later, verifiers representing 90.9% of the network's pledged amount voted to transfer the frozen funds into a multi-signature wallet for return to affected users.

The freeze saved most of the stolen funds, but it also raises the same question now raised about THORChain: How much control does the network have before people begin to question its true decentralization?

Sui 表示，其验证者共同努力保障网络安全，其投票权来自委托质押。然而，批评者认为，一组拥有冻结资金能力的114名验证者对网络上发生的事情拥有相当大的控制权。其他人则有不同的看法，认为验证者正在利用他们可用的工具来阻止被盗资金。

这种差异对于 THORChain 的辩论至关重要。THORChain 表示它不会冻结单个兑换或阻止特定攻击者，而其批评者指出网络的共享金库和签名系统是证据，表明其操作员对用户资金的控制权比比特币矿工或以太坊验证者更大。