蜻蜓合伙人拒绝“地堡模式”末日论，敦促采取积极的加密行动

Dragonfly partners refute the doomsday theory of the "asylum model" and call for proactive cryptographic defenses

As concerns grow that advances in artificial intelligence may undermine the core cryptographic assumptions on which cryptocurrency wallets rely, Dragonfly managing partner Haseeb Qureshi challenges the idea that users can simply "asylum" by simply moving funds to a new address. In an X (formerly Twitter) post posted on Thursday, he described the "refuge model" as "the doomsday of cryptography" and pointed out that if widely used signature schemes are breached, simply migrating addresses will not solve systemic risks.

Qureshi also urged networks to prepare for scenarios where cryptographic signatures were invalidated, proposing a scheme called the "cryptographic recovery model." The scheme relies on a hash-based backup mechanism that allows a restore operation by the verifier when the signature expires. The comments followed a warning from Ethereum researcher Justin Drake, who pointed out that the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), widely used in the cryptocurrency space, could be cracked "within months rather than years" in the worst-case scenario, based on OpenAI's report on progress in mathematics.

Core Points

• Dragonfly's Haseeb Qureshi said that the "refuge model"(transferring funds to a new address) does not eliminate risks, because if other users 'assets are breached and sold off, it will still affect the overall market.
• Qureshi proposes establishing a "cryptographic recovery model" that utilizes a hash-based backup signature so that the verifier can force recovery when the signature is cracked.
• Glassnode data cited by Qureshi shows that millions of bitcoins may be at risk for reasons such as address reuse or specific address formats.
• Ethereum researcher Justin Drake warned that ECDSA may fail sooner than expected and that the timeline may be "in months rather than years."

Why the "refuge model" may not be enough

Qureshi's core objection is that address-level protection is only effective if a broken cryptographic system cannot affect the broader market. He wrote in a Thursday post that the "refuge model" protects investors 'coins only if they never remove assets from a "new address" that reduces risk. He added that this approach would be economically fragile if other coins were also at risk. In Qureshi's view, even if a user avoids immediate breach, the value of his protected position may deteriorate and eventually become "worthless" in a scenario where "all other coins are hacked and sold off on a large scale.

Instead of focusing on personal hygiene habits-where users may rotate addresses to reduce public key exposure-Qureshi advocates protocol level resilience. This shift is critical because it recognizes that cryptographic failures can be systemic: If the underlying signature mechanisms that support wallets and transactions become unreliable, threats are not limited to a certain address pattern or a certain user's behavior.

Glassnode data: Millions of bitcoins may be exposed

The debate comes amid data showing that a large proportion of the Bitcoin supply may be vulnerable to public key or address pattern risks. Qureshi cited Glassnode's analysis that 6.26 million BTC are located in "fragile addresses," which he believes is a potential consequence of the way keys and address information are reused or encoded.

According to Glassnode, 4.33 million BTC are at risk of exposure due to address reuse-theoretically, moving these coins to a new address would end this particular form of exposure. In addition, according to further breakdown details shared by Glassnode co-founder Rafael Schultze-Kraft in a Thursday X post, another 1.94 million BTC are at risk of exposure due to their address format.

This exposure is not limited to cold storage. Qureshi pointed out that nearly 1.8 million bitcoins from exposed supply are held on cryptocurrency exchanges. He cited Glassnode's observation that 57% of all exchange balances are currently exposed, emphasizing that operating custodians could face higher immediate pressure if cryptographic assumptions fail.

Drake's warning: ECDSA may crash sooner than expected

These comments build on previous warnings from Ethereum researcher Justin Drake. In an X post on Wednesday, Drake said it was reasonable to expect that the ECDSA could collapse before the hypothetical "qday" event-the day when quantum power becomes strong enough to threaten modern cryptography. Drake's timeline is "in months, not years" at worst.

Drake将其担忧与周二OpenAI关于人工智能在数学领域进步速度的报告联系起来。他还建议用户逐渐将资金转移到未暴露公钥的新钱包，认为人工智能的进步可能会在量子计算机到来之前带来密码分析方面的突破。

以太坊联合创始人Vitalik Buterin同意需要认真对待“加速数学”的人工智能风险，但他不建议用户立即匆忙将资金转移到新钱包。这种差异凸显了社区方法中的张力：是在用户层面优化短期暴露减少，还是优先考虑长期协议韧性，假设存在广泛、协调的风险。

Qureshi的“密码学恢复模式”提案

针对“避难模式”，Qureshi的答案是在密码学签名不再可靠时的结构化恢复路径。他提出了“密码学恢复模式”，描述为用户可以映射到其地址的基于哈希的备份签名计划。

在这一概念中，如果签名被破解，验证者将有权强制进行恢复。其实用重要性在于，恢复设计旨在应对故障状态——重点从试图防止每种暴露转向确保当密码学机制失效时系统能够继续运行。

While address rotation reduces certain types of exposure, Qureshi's framework suggests that such steps may not protect environments where attackers can exploit compromised signature capabilities in bulk on a large scale. For investors, this raises a key question: If cryptographic failures become common, will value preservation depend mainly on individuals 'wallet practices, or will it depend on the speed and effectiveness of recovery or verification mechanisms introduced by the network?

Readers interested in this area should focus on whether the industry's response has moved beyond user guidance and towards implementable protocol design. The next signal to watch for is whether researchers and core developers will agree on specific recovery mechanisms-especially those that can be adopted without requiring every user to act perfectly immediately under uncertainty.